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GRAY

[L. A. No. 2231:3.

v.

BRINKERIIOPF

In Bank.

[41 C.2d

June 30, 19:33.]

MILTON F. GRAY et al., Appellants, v. VERD C. BRINKERHO:B':B' et al., Respondents.
[1] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether defendant
was guilty of negligence or plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence is ordinarily a question of mixed fact and law, and
may be determined as a matter of law only if reasonable men
following the law can draw but one conclusion from the evidence presented.
[2] Automobiles-Care Toward Pedestrians-Yielding Right of
Way.-Failure of motorist to yield right of way to pedestrian
crossing roadway within marked crosswalk, as required by Veh.
Code, § :360, subd. (a), constitutes a violation of the statute
and negligence as a matter of law in the absence of reasonable
explanation for such conduct.
[3] !d.-Care Toward Pedestrians-Yielding Right of Way.-Failure of motorist to yield right of way to pedestrian crossing
street within marked crosswalk is not excused by fact that his
attention was "diverted" by a "fast approaching car" which
made a right turn into street instead of continuing on another
street as he expected it to do, where motorist had stopped in
center of intersection to allow other vehicle to pass and thereafter started his truck again, driving into crosswalk without
seeing pedestrians who might be there, and striking plaintiff,
it appearing that motorist could have seen plaintiff if he had
exercised ordinary care.
[ 4] !d.-Care Toward Pedestrians-Persons Within Crosswalk.A motorist has no right to assume that a marked pe.destrian
crosswalk is clear, and it is his duty in starting up and driving
his vehicle into and through the crosswalk to ascertain whether
plainly visible pede.strians are using such crosswalk and to
yield the right of way to them.
[5] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Persons Crossing Streets.-A
person crossing a street within a marked crosswalk is not guilty
of contributory negligence where, until "perhaps a second"
before she was struck by defendant's vehicle, she had no reason
[1] See Cal.Jur., Neg·ligence., §§ 138, 141; Am.Jur., Neglige.nce,
§§ 344, 348.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, §§ 269, 270; Am.Jur., Automobiles, § 211 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, §§ 158, 160, 168, 169;
[2-4] Automobiles,§ 117; [5] Automobiles,§ 128; [6] Automobiles,
§ 297(3).
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to believe that defendant intended to violate her right of way
and proceed into the crosswalk and against her body, she not
being required to "run" from the vehicle, and where she made
an effort "to hurry to the island in the middle."
[6] !d.-Province of Court and Jury-Contributory Negligence.The rule that whether a mistake in judgment by a pedestrian,
when crossing a street, as to the speed and danger of an approaching vehicle constitutes contributory negligence is a
question for the jury, is inapplicable where the only relevant
mistake plaintiff could have made as to the speed and danger
of the approaching vehicle would be the belief that defendant
driver intended to obey the law and not turn into and across
the pedestrian crosswalk and strike her in complete disregard
of her right of way, and where defendant's vehicle, which had
come to a complete stop in the center of the intersection and
after starting again had at no time exceeded a speed of 8
to 10 miles per hour, would give a reasonable pedestrian lawfully in the crosswalk no cause for apprehension that the
speed of the vehicle constituted such an imminent danger that
she should run from it, as under such circumstances she had
the right to assume that the driver would obey the law, drive
in a reasonable manner, observe her right of way, and yield it.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Lol"
Angeles County. A. A. Scott, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by
pedestrian when struck by vehicle in a marked crosswalk.
.Judgment for defendants reversed.
Hirson & Horn and Theodore A. Horn for Appellants.
Joseph A. Zahradka and Robert Glines for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, appeal from an adverse judgment entered upon a jury verdict
in their action for damages for personal injuries suffered by
the wife when she was struck by a pickup truck driven by
defendant Brinkerhoff in the course of his employment by
defendant Nitzen. \Ve have concluded that the evidence
establishes negligence as a matter of law on the part of
Brinkerhoff and is insufficient to support a finding of contributory negligence on the part of the wife, and that the
judgment must therefore be reversed. Hereinafter in this
opinion plaintiff-wife will be referred to as plaintiff, and
Brinkerhoff will be referred to as defendant.
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The evidence is without substantial conflict. At the time
of the accident, plaintiff, carrying a bag of groceries, was attempting to walk across Manchester Boulevard, which runs
in an east-west direction, at its intersection with Airport
Boulevard, which runs north-south, in Los Angeles. Plaintiff waited on the curb at the southeast corner of the intersection until the traffic light changed from red to green for
north-south traffic on Airport, so that she could lawfully proceed north across Manchester in the marked pedestrian crosswalk. The crosswalk was some 15 feet wide, and the distance
from the curb, where plaintiff was standing, to an island
located down the center of Manchester was about 30 feet.
Defendant, who was driving south on Airport in a pickup
truck, had stopped at the northwest corner of the intersection, also waiting for the green light; he was in the lane
next to the center of Airport, as he intended to make a left
turn onto Manchester. When the light changed to green,
plaintiff started walking across Manchester in the crosswalk,
and defendant started his truck, signaled his intention to make
a left turn, and proceeded into the intersection. When he
was about halfway across Manchester and before making his
left turn, defendant again stopped his truck to permit another car, which was going north on Airport, to continue
through the intersection. The other car, however, made a
right turn into Manchester, and defendant then started his
truck again, made his left turn, and drove into the crosswalk,
striking plaintiff's shoulder with a "rack" attached over
the left front fender of the truck, "pushing" her out of the
crosswalk, and injuring her.
Plaintiff, while still waiting on the curb for the light to turn
green, observed defendant's truck stopped at the intersection in the lane next to the center line of Airport, saw
the truck start to move toward the south when the signal
changed and plaintiff started north across Manchester, and
watched its progress into the intersection. When plaintiff
had gone about 10 feet from the curb, the truck was approaching the center of the intersection. When it reached the center
of the intersection it was going about 5 miles an hour, and
plaintiff realized at that time that it was going to make a
left turn. When the truck, after stopping for the approaching
car, had started again and was about 15 feet from the crosswalk plaintiff was some 10 feet from the island, walking
"App:coximately in the middle" of the crosswalk. When
plaintiff was a step or two from the island the truck, which
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both plaintiff and defendant testified was then going at a
speed of 8 or 10 miles an hour, struck her. The truck moved
7 or 8 feet further ahead and then stopped. Plaintiff when
first struck dropped her bag of groceries, seized hold of the
rack above the fender in order not to be thrown under the
truck, and receive repeated blows to her knees and shoulder
as she "was being pushed back" out of the crosswalk. The
weather and the street were dry and it was clear daylight at
the time.
Plaintiff testified that she had been watching the truck
almost continuously during her progress across the intersection; through the truck's windshield she saw both defendant driver and a coemploye who was riding with him and
they seemed "to be looking in" her direction; when she "first
realized that the truck was coming on the crosswalk . . . I
tried to hurry to the island in the middle,'' although she did
not run; she then had "perhaps a second" to "get out of
the way"; she was then "about five feet" from the island;
''I was in plain sight and . . . he looked like he would pass
right behind me . . . [T]here wasn't room for him to go in
front of me by that time.''
Defendant testified that his windshield was clear; he did
not see plaintiff at any time until after his "truck had actually
impacted her," and he saw no other people in the crosswalk;
after he stopped in the center of the intersection for the oncoming car, he was "looking east on Manchester" as he approached the crosswalk; there was nothing that would obstruct
his view except the corner post on the truck as he was in
the swing of the left turn; his brakes were in good condition.
[1] Whether or not defendant was guilty of negligence
(see Toschi v. Christian (1944), 24 Cal.2d 354, 360 [149 P.2d
848] ; Mosley v. Arden Farms Co. ( 1945), 26 Cal.2d 213, 217
[157 P.2d 372, 158 A.L.R. 872]; Polk v. City of Los Angeles
(1945), 26 Cal.2d 519, 530 [159 P.2d 931]; 19 Cal.Jur. 731,
and cases there cited) or plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence (Pewitt v. Riley (1945), 27 Ca1.2d 310, 316 [163
P.2d 873]; Anthony v. Hobbie (1945), 25 Cal.2d 814, 818
[155 P.2d 826], and cases there cited; see, also, 19 Cal.Jur.
735-738) is ordinarily a question of mixed fact and law an(i
may be determined as a matter of law only if reasonable m~n
following the law can draw but one conclusion from the evidence presented. (See, also, Zibbell v. Southern Pac. Co.
(1911), 160 Cal. 237, 241 [116 P. 513]; Reaugh v. Cudahy
Packing Co. (1922), 189 Cal. 335, 343 [208 P. 125]; Young
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v. Southern Pac. Co. (1920), 182 Cal. 369, 375 [190 P. 36];
Dennis v. Gonzales (1949), 91 Cal.App.2d 203,209 [205 P.2d
55].)
[2] It is our view that defendant's own testimony shows
indubitably that he was guilty of negligence proximately
causing plaintiff's injuries. By the provisions of section 560,
subdivision (a), of the Vehicle Code, "The driver of a vehicle
shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within any marked crosswalk. . . . " It is undisputed that
defendant did not yield the right of way to plaintiff. Such
failure constitutes a violation of the statute and negligence
as a matter of law in the absence of reasonable explanation for
defendant's conduct. (See Satterlee v. Orange Glen School
Dist. (1947), 29 Cal.2d 581, 589 [177 P.2d 279]; Ornales v.
Wigger ( 1950), 35 Cal.2d 47 4, 4 77-480 [218 P .2d 531] ; Finney
v. Wierman (1942), 52 Cal.App.2d 282, 284 [126 P.2d 143];
Lafrenz v. Stoddard (1942), 50 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [122 P.2d
374] .)
[3] Defendant in attempted excuse of his conduct suggests that his "attention w~s diverted" by the "fast approaching car" which made a right turn into Manchester
instead of continuing north on Airport as defendant had
expected it to do. However, that vehicle after turning to
the right obviously constituted no hazard to defendant, who
had stopped in the center of the intersection to allow it to
pass, and provides no excuse whatsoever for his thereafter
starting his truck again, driving into the crosswalk without
seeing pedestrians who might be there, and striking plaintiff.
];-,or a driver to cause or allow his vehicle to continue into
and across such a crosswalk while his attention is so ''diverted''
constitutes in itself a yiolation of the statute for which he must
be held responsible.
Defendant suggests further that although his attention
was ''diverted,'' nevertheless ''while in his turn, the left
front corner post on the truck probably obscured his seeing''
plaintiff. Again, we are not impressed with this tentative
offering of an excuse. Under the circumstances shown it
appears to us that the evidence does not reasonably admit
of any conclusion other than that defendant could have fulfilled his duty to look for pedestrians and could have seen
plaintiff if he had exercised ordinary care. [4] He had no
right to assume that the crosswalk was clear (People v. Lett
(1947), 77 Cal.App.2d 917, 919 [177 P.2d 47]); it was his
duty in starting up and driving his vehicle into and through
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the crosswalk to ascertain whether plainly visible pedestrians
were using such crosswalk and it was his obligation to yield
the right of way to them (Fischer v. Keen (1941), 43 Cal.
App.2d 244, 249 [110 P.2d 693] ). We hold that the evidence
establishes that defendant was negligent as a matter of law.
[5] It is equally apparent that plaintiff was free from
negligence proximately contributing to her injuries. She was
lawfully where pedestrians are expected to be found at intersections and until "perhaps a second" before the impact she
had no reason to believe that defendant intended to violate
her right of way and proceed into the crosswalk and against
her body. Under such circumstances, she was not allowed
sufficient time, and it does not appear that she was required,
to "run " 1 from his vehicle, as defendant (apparently seeking
to invoke a sort of reverse last clear chance doctrine) suggests she should have done, although she did make an effort
''to hurry to the island in the middle.''
[6] Defendant relies on the rule that "Whether a mistake
in judgment by a pedestrian when crossing a street, as to the
speed and danger of an approaching vehicle constitutes contributory negligence is a question for the jury." (Kirk v.
Los Angeles Ry. Corp. (1945), 26 Cal.2d 833, 839 [161 P.2d
673, '164 A.L.R. 1] .) In the cited case the traffic signal
changed after plaintiff pedestrian had started across the intersection; plaintiff's companions reached the far curb safely
but plaintiff while hurrying to do the same dropped her purse
and was struck by a streetcar when she stopped to pick it up.
The judgment of nonsuit was reversed by this court with
the statement that the matter of contributory negligence should
have gone to the jury. In the case now presented, however, the
only relevant mistake which plaintiff could have made as to
the speed and danger of the approaching vehicle would be the
belief that defendant driver intended to obey the law and
not turn into and across the pedestrian crosswalk and strike
her in complete disregard of her right of way. Defendant's
vehicle, which had come to a complete stop in the center of
the intersection and after starting again had at no time exceeded a speed of 8 to 10 miles an hour, obviously would give
a reasonable pedestrian lawfully in the crosswalk no cause
for apprehension that the speed of the vehicle constituted
such an imminent danger that she should run from it. Under
1
It may be noted that there are traffic signs in some localities which
expressly direct pedestrians to "WALK" and do not suggest "RuN."
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such circumstances we find no merit in defendant's argument
that inasmuch as plaintiff had observed the truck from the
time it left the center of the intersection until it struck her,
her failure to inerease her speed until ''perhaps a second''
before he pushed her out of the crosswalk could be considered
to be contributory negligence. (See LeBlanc v. Browne
(1947), 78 Cal.App.2d 63, 71-75 [177 P.2d 347] .) Under
the circumstances shown here, plaintiff had the right to assume
that defendant driver would obey the law, drive in a reasonable manner, observe her right of way, and yield it. (See
Schulman v. Los Angeles Ry. Gorp. (1941), 44 Cal.App.2d
122, 126 [111 P.2d 924]; Foerster v. Direito (1946), 75 Cal.
App.2d 323, 330-331 [170 P.2d 986]; Ladas v. Johnson's B.
& W. Taxicab Oo. (1941), 43 Cal.App.2d 223, 228 [110 P.2d
449] .)
By reason of our conclusion that the evidence is insufficient
to support the verdict, it becomes unnecessary to consider
plaintiff's further contention that certain of the instructions
g·iven to the jury prejudically overemphasized her duty and
minimized that of defendant.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTEH, J.-I dissent.
Contrary to the majority opinion the issues of negligence
and contributory negligence were for the jury, and its determination thereof against plaintiff is binding on this court.
The evidence is such that reasonable minds could find either
the presence or absence of the factors necessary to establish
those issues.
The basis of the majority opinion is, on the issue of negligence, that defendant was required to yield the right of
way to plaintiff and his failure to do so was negligence as a
matter of law; on the issue of contributory negligence, that
plaintiff was not required to run when she saw defendant's
truck approaching and thus was free from contributory negligence as a matter of law. Those bases fail to take into
consideration other factors which the jury could and did use
as a basis for its verdict.
On the issue of negligence there are several significant
facts upon which a finding of no negligence could be based.
'l'he intersection where the accident occurred was a busy one
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and there was considerable traffic there at the time. This
presented a situation where plaintiff was not the only person
to be watched--toward whom care was to be exercised. Other
hazards required constant attention by defendant with the
accompanying necessity of making decisions governing his
conduct. Whether his decisions were those of a person of
ordinary prudence was a question for the jury. Defendant
proceeded into the intersection with the "Go" signal as he
was lawfully entitled to do. He gave proper signals for
making a left turn which was legally authorized. He was
travelling at a low rate of speed. As he was making a left
turn and approaching the crosswalk which plaintiff was using,
a car approaching at a high speed from his right swung right
around the corner across his prospective route. That car
crossed the crosswalk to the rear of plaintiff. It is reasonable to assume that defendant's attention would be focussed
on that vehicle which would have a bearing on whether he
was careless in failing to observe plaintiff in the crosswalk.
Moreover, he may reasonably have assumed that, as that car
proceeded across the crosswalk apparently without mishap,
there was no one on the crosswalk. Defendant testified that
he did not see plaintiff on the crosswalk. The jury could
have believed that testimony. True, it could have disbelieved
it, because plaintiff was there and there was evidence that
plaintiff was looking in the direction of defendant's car, but
that was the jury's function, not ours. There were reasons
why the jury may have chosen to believe defendant. He testified that the upright support for the top, door and windshield
of his car obscured his vision. His attention was diverted by
the car which turned right into his path and led him into
a sense of security by its crossing the crosswalk without mishap. There was a large amount of traffic at the intersection.
Indeed the majority opinion is based on the theory that defendant was negligent in failing to see plaintiff because she
was on the crosswalk, but that assumes that she was there.
That assumption cannot be made because the jury could have
disbelieved her testimony as to her presence in the crosswalk-at a point in the path of defendant's oncoming car.
From testimony that defendant did not see her in the crosswalk when, if she was where she said she was, the jury could
infer that she was not there; that she had reached the island
in the center of the street, had become confused and stepped
back into the path of defendant's car, or that she darted ahead
across the path of defendant's car just as the right turning
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car passed behind her. Of course, if defendant did not see
plaintiff before the impact, and his failure to see her was not
negligence, there is no basis for a finding of negligence in
his failure to yield the right of way and the entire foundation of the majority opinion crumbles.
·with reference to contributory negligence, there was sufficient from which the jury could find its existence. Plaintiff
testified that she was watching defendant's car approaching
all of the time. It could be inferred, therefore, that she walked
directly into the path of an oncoming car and after taking
that chance, made no effort to hurry or avoid being struck
by the car. Moreover, as before discussed, the jury could
have believed that defendant did not see her, that she darted
in front of his car when the other car made a right turn
behind her, or could have disbelieved her testimony that she
was watching defendant's car and concluded that she walked
across the crosswalk blindly and with total disregard of her
safety. Based upon any of those premises or other possibilities, reasonable men could have concluded that she was
guilty of contributory negligence.
Furthermore, the facts may have appeared to the jury in
such a light as to justify the conclusion that neither plaintiff
nor defendant was negligent-that the occurrence was what is
sometimes called an "unavoidable accident" where no one
is at fault and hence no recovery may be had.
In regard to yielding the right of way where a pedestrian
was struck while crossing the street and defendant testified he
did not see him, the court said in Edwards v. McCormick,
79 Cal.App.2d 800, 804 [181 P.2d 58]: "In the instant case,
as commented upon in respondents' brief, 'It was for the jury
to decide whether respondent's failure to see the deceased was
a negligent failure. His failure to yield the right of way
arose from his failure to see the pedestrian before he did; the
two are inextricably intertwined. Hence it would have been
an invasion of the province of the jury for the court to have
laid down an inflexible rule that if respondent did not yield
the right of way he ·was negligent as a matter of law.' Under
the evidence disclosed by the record, negligence and contributory negligence were questions of fact and not of law. . . .
''The appellants insist that 'The verdict and judgment are
against the law, in that deceased had a right to assume defendant would obey the law (and yield the right of way), and
in that deceased being confronted by a sudden peril he was
not guilty of contributory negligence in attempting to pass in
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front of defendant's automobile.' It is also argued that
'plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the presumption that
the deceased obeyed the law in that he exercised ordinary care
for his own safety and therefore the verdict was against the
evidence if the defendant was guilty of negligence.' These
contentions, however, proceed on the assumption that the
defendant was, and the deceased was not, guilty of negligence
in the situation presented. And, as already indicated, such
matters involve questions of fact, not of law. Neither a presumption of due care on the part of the deceased, nor any
right to assume that respondent driver would yield the right
of way, can alter this situation, -or, in fact, do more than
merely raise a conflict in the evidence. As pointed out in
respondents' brief, 'It is clear that a pedestrian has no privilege of relying on right of way blindly or in the face of obvious danger.' (Fischer v. Keen, 43 Cal.App.2d 244 [110 P.2d
693] ; Reed v. Stroh, 54 Cal.App.2d 183 [128 P.2d 829] .) "
(See Bedell v. Duniven, 77 Cal.App.2d 145 [174 P.2d 666] ;
O'Brien v. Schellberg, 59 Cal.App.2d 764 [140 P.2d 159] .)
'l'he conclusion reached by the majority here must be based
upon the unqualified assumption that all of the testimony of
plaintiff is true and that at least some of defendant's testimony is false. Thus the majority is weighing the evidence,
without seeing the witnesses or hearing them testify, thereby
invading the exclusive province of the triers of fact-the
jury and trial judge. The position of the majority here is
not only out of harmony with the settled law of this state
(see Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [143 P.2d 689] ; Crawford v. So1tthern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427 [45 P.2d 183] ), but
it places an undue burden upon this court-that of deciding
issues of fact. I have heretofore adverted to the evils of this
practice (see concurring and dissenting opinions in Daniels
v. City and County of San Francisco, 40 Cal.2d 614, 627
[255 P.2d 785] ; Saporito v. Purex Corp., Ltd., 40 Cal.2d
608, 612 [255 P.2d 7] ; Barrett v. City of Claremont,
ante, p. 70, 75 [256 P.2d 977] ). So far as this court is
concerned, it is of recent development-just the last year or
two (see Rodabaugh v. Tekus, 39 Cal.2d 290 [246 P.2d 663] ;
Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d
656 [225 P.2d 431] ; Better Food Mkts. v. American Dist.
Teleg. Co., 40 Cal.2d 179 [253 P.2d 10]; Atkinson v. Pacific
Fire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal.2d 192 [253 P.2d 18] ; Sutter
Butte Canal Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 40 Cal.2d 139 [251
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P.2d 975]; Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 40
Cal.2d 102 [251 P.2d 955]; Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co.,
40 Cal.2d 224 [253 P.2d 441]; Goodman v. Harris, 40 Cal.2d
254 [253 P.2d 447] ; Pirkle v. Oakdale Union etc. School Dist._,
40 Cal.2d 207 [253 P.2d 1] ; Burtis v. Universal Pictures Co.,
Inc., 40 Cal.2d 823 [256 P.2d 933]; Ktlrlan v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 40 Cal.2d 799 [256 P.2d 962]; Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 40 Cal.2d 778 [256 P.2d 947]; Turner v.
Mellon, ante, p. 45 [257 P.2d 15] ; Barrett v. City of
Claremont, ante, p. 70 [256 P.2d 977] ; Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 [241 P.2d 990] ). I cannot refrain from
again reiterating that this practice is not only in direct violation of the constitutional right of litigants to trial by jury,
but is an insidious abuse of the judicial process.
About 10 years ago (December 1, 1943), Mr. Justice
Schauer in speaking for the majority of this court took a
position diametrically opposed to the position now taken by
him in the case at bar. As author of the majority opinion
in Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [143 P.2d 689], he clearly
and forcefully restated the traditional rule with respect to
the function of this court and the District Courts of Appeal
in reviewing findings of a trial court or jury. I concurred
with Mr. Justice Schauer in the views expressed in that
opinion and still believe that it should be the law of this
state. I quote his pertinent language in that case and commend it to his consideration in reaching a conclusion in the
case at bar. In Estate of Bristol Mr. Justice Schauer stated
at pages 223 and 224 as follows: ''The rules of evidence,
the weight to be accorded to the evidence, and the province of
a reviewing court, are the same in a will contest as in any
other civil case. (Estate of Snowball (1910), 157 Cal. 301,
305 [107 P. 598]; Estate of Barr (1924), 69 Cal.App. 16, 33
[230 P. 181] .) The rule as to our province is: 'In reviewing
the evidence . . . all conflicts must be resolved in favor of
the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences
indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elementary . . . principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked
as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins
and ends with a determination as to whether there is any
Stlbstantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which
will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two
or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts,
the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.' (Italics added.) (Craw-
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ford v. Southern Pac. Co. (1935), 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [45 P.2d
183].) 'I'he rule quoted is as applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when considering a jury's verdict.
The critical word in the definition is 'substantial'; it is a
door which can lead as readily to abuse as to practical or
enlightened justice. It is common knowledge among judges
and lawyers that many cases are determined to the entire
satisfaction of trial judges or j1tries, on their factual issues,
by eviclerwe which is over·whelming in its persttasiveness but
which may appear relatively unsubstantial----1,f it can be reflected at allr-in a phonographie reeorcl. AppeUate courts,
therefore, if there be any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency
of the evidence to s1tstain a finding, should resolve that doubt
in favor of the finding; and in searching the record and exploring the inferences which may arise from what is found
there, to discover whether such doubt or conflict exists, the
court should be realistic and practical. Upon such view of
the law we cannot hold that any essential finding in this case
is unsupported." (Emphasis added.)
In some of my dissenting opinions I have called attention
to the long established rule that it is only in cases where
the uncontradicted evidence is such that reasonable minds
cannot differ, that the issues of negligence and contributory
negligence may be decided as issues of law. Heretofore the
majority have not seen fit to discuss this rule, but have
ignored it by the simple process of arbitrarily disregarding
the determination of the trier of fact and holding as a matter
of law that the evidence supporting such determination was
insufficient (see Rodabaugh v. Tekus, S'Upra; Better Food
Mkts. v. American Dist. Teleg. Co., snpra; Atkinson v. Pacific
Fire Extinguisher Co., snpra; Goodman v. Harris, supra;
Pirkle v. Oakdale Union etc. School Dist., supra; Burtis v.
Universal Pictttres Co., Inc., supra; Turner v. Mellon, supra;
Barrett v. City of maremont, S1lpra). Here, however, the
majority cites the cases which have established the rule, and
then misstates it and refuses to apply it to this case. In this
connection the majority opinion states: ''Whether or not
defendant was guilty of negligence [citing cases] or plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence [citing cases] is ordinarily a question of mixed fact and law and may be determined as a matter of law only if reasonable men following
the law can draw but one conclusion from the evidence presented.'' The foregoing is not a correct statement of the rule.
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·while the statement of the rule has been couched in different
language in some of the cases, it has been repeatedly declared
as follows: " 'It is only where no fact is left in doubt, and no
deduction or inference other than negligence can be drawn by
the jury from the evidence, that the court can say, as a matter
of law, that contributory negligence is established. Even
where the facts are undisputed, if reasonable minds might
draw different conclusions upon the question of negligence,
the question is one of fact for the jury.' (Johnson v. Southern
Pacific R. R. Co., 154 Cal. 285 [97 P. 520] ; Seller v. Market
St. Ry. Co., 139 Cal. 268 [72 P. 1006] ; Herbert v. Southern
Pacific Co., 121 Cal. 227 [53 P. 651].)" (Zibbell v. Southern
Pacific Co., 160 Cal. 237, 241 [116 P. 513] .) What the majority
here mean by the phrase, "reasonable men following the law"
is not clear. However, by its attempted application of the rule
to this case, I assume that the majority mean that those Justices who constitute the present majority of this court are the
only "reasonable men following the law" who have passed
on the issues in this case. If that is what the majority intend
to imply, and I can conceive of no other meaning, then I
resent the implication both on behalf of the members of the
jury, the learned trial judge and the three able and honorable
members of the District Court of Appeal (see Gray v.
Brinkerhoff (Cal.App.) 249 P.2d 571) as well as for myself,
all of whom disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority of this court in this case. According to the majority
none of the above persons is a reasonable person following
the law.
I have no hesitancy in stating that I am not at all chagrined
to be so classified by the majority of this court, as I am confident that neither unbiased contemporary observers nor posterity will sanction the distortions to which the majority of
this court has resorted in its attempt to justify its invasion
of the fact finding functions of the jury and trial judge. I
feel rather that those who believe in the democratic process
may properly but regretfully refer to this period in our
judicial history as the era when the Supreme Court of California assumed the role of the fact finder in negligence cases.
I have examined the record in this case and find no error
prejudicial to plaintiff.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment.

